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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TRB STATE OF UTAH
McKAY DEE HOSPITAL,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 16182

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and TED CLARK SPACKMAN,:
Defendants.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
ORIGINAL ACTION TO REVIEW THE PROCEEDINGS AND
ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
JOSEPH C. RUST
KIRTON & McCONKIE
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
FRANK V. NELSON
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendants
Industrial Commission
and Ted Clark Spackman
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action involves a determination by the Industrial
Commission that defendant-claimant Spackman had sustained a
compensable industrial injury, which determination is contested
by plaintiff.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
This case was heard by an Industrial Commission
administrative law judge on October 2, 1978, whereupon on October
24, 1978 an order awarding defendant-claimant Spackman certain
benefits was entered by the Commission.

On November 6, 1978 an

extention was granted for filing a motion for review and on
November 13, 1978 a motion for review of the order of the
Industrial Commission was filed.

On November 28, 1978 the motion

for review was denied by the Industrial Commission.

A petition

for writ of review was filed with this Court on December 8, 1978
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-83.
Relief Sought on Appeal
Plaintiff seeks to have this Court determine that
defendant-claimant Spackman did not

~ustain

a compensable injury

under Utah workmen's Compensation Law, that the order of the
Commission granting such compensation should be overturned, and
tlat the claim of defendant-claimant Spackman should be denied in
tt3

entir~ty.

STATEMENT OF

~HE

F~CTS

On April S, 1978 defendant-claimant
•Tc!~~~d

:,L,~t•f

on a

part-tim~

~cKay

Dee

Spack~an

was

bas1s in the dietary division of

Hospl~31.

o~rl,J

a

hal~

hour break in his
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work on that day, defendant-claimant Spackman talked to his
•uperviao~

with

~eqa~d

to his

wo~k

schedule.

As a result of the

conve~•ation

defendant-claimant Spackman became very angry.

con•equence,

afte~

ga~baqe

As a

leaving the supervisor's office he hit some

can• and so•e boxes, and finally in a fit of anger hit

80ae . . tal •winqinq

doo~s

with his fists knowing full well that

the riqht door was locked.
As a result of hitting the right locked metal door,
defendant Spackman broke the little finger on his right hand.
About two weeks after the cast had been put on the finger and
while defendant Spackman was in bed, he was startled and hit a
low ceiling overhead with his cast.

This caused the pin which

had been inserted at the time of the original casting of the
finger to come out.

Later some infection developed in the bone.

After the last of some four or five subsequent casts on the
finger had been removed, defendant Spackman was released to
r~turn

to work on August 16, 1978.
ARGUME~T

POINT I
THE INJURY fOR WHICH DEFENDANT SPACKMAN SEEKS
COMPENSATION WAS PURPOSELY SELF-INFLICTED.
T~e

definition of a compensable accident

meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law of Utah
"the

sa~e ~as

S 35-l-45.

not purposely sclf-1nfl1cted."

~~e

test1~ony

i~

t~is

cas~

~ithin

the

r~quir~s

that

Utah Code Ann.

1s clear that

i~

fact

t~e

1njury [or ~hie~ de~~ndant ~~a~~~ar1 s~~~ks r~~QV·~~y W3S :1Jr?~s~~::·
or lntenti~)nail~' sel~-lnflt:::t~(i,

-:-""Jere

1:~

...,."

,~..!·~:-.;tJ.,,n

t:~3.~
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Jf'=~·

defendant Spackman left his supervisor he was very . .d.

Ria

hitting a garbage can and some boxes in the back rooa clearly
demonstrates that he was taking out his anger by hitting things.
Re did not stay in the back room very long but rather, continuing
in anger, smashed his fist against the metal doors knowing lull
well that the right metal door was not ever open but waa always
kept locked.

Defendant Spackman's own testimony best describes

the situation:
A: Well I was mad. I hit some garbage cans,
I hit some boxes and garbage cans, and I went
through the door mad.

~:
Just like -- Well I was mad. I went
running out the doors, you know, and pushed
the doors open, you know, in a very angry
state. I pushed the doors open, and I hit
the door.

Transcript Page 10.
Okay, when you went through those metal
doors, did you hit your fist against the
metal doors, or was it with your open hand?
Q:

A:

It had to have been with my fist, because
got my knuckle. It wasn't -- Well, you
know. It was both fists that I hit it with.
it

And that was in anger? You don't
normally open the door that way?

Q:

A: No,
way.

I

don't normally open the door that

Transcript Page 21.
J:

You hit the right door, --

,; :

y" s.

Q:

--

; :

'{ .-?

t~at

dtdn't move?

s.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

Qz You knew that that door was always locked
though?
A:

Yea.

Tranacript at Page 26.
There ahould be no doubt that defendant Spackman's
actiona in hitting a metal door with his fist after he had hit
9arbage cana and boxes and while he was admittedly very mad can

be clasaified aa a purposeful, self-inflicted injury, as that
ter. is used in the Utah Workmen's Compensation Law.
The award in this case by the Industrial Commission
does not deny the anger of Mr. Spackman nor that he struck both
doors in his anger.

Rather the decision of the Industrial

Ca.miasion is that •self injury other than suicide or injury from
auicide attempt is not a defense• under the Utah Statute.
Industrial Commission Order, October 24, 1978.

In reaching that

decision the admin1strative law judge cited two Utah cases.
In the case of Sugar v. Industrial Commission, 94 Utah
56, 75 P.2d 311 (1938)
whether a

deat~

determination

t~e

court had before it the question of

in fact suicidal.

~as

The court

would exclude any other

whlc~

~ind

~ade

no

of self-

infltcted tnjury as a defense for purposes of Industrial
Compensation recovery.
th~t

since the

P • 2d

2 ll S ,

( 19 4 6

de3t~

1 ,

:

~e

Rather, the court jecided tn that

~as

sutcldal,

c .1 .o •!

j 1d

.~ .J t

ther~

could

t ~ ·: o 1 ·: »

3 '1

~e

1 :1 j '-'

recove~y.

no

s

~

c~se

r

1 1

1

1 :1

J ur :
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did not.

That, however, does not mean that a defense of self-

inflicted injury is not a valid defense.

It only means that

there has to be good evidence on that point.

One cannot rely

only on evidence that there was an intentional or willful
violation of a safety rule.
The administrative law judge also relied on the noted
treatise of Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation,
Volume I A, Section 36.50.

Not only is that treatise misapplied

in this case but it is also misquoted.
says:

The section involved

"The defense of intentional self-injury, not apart fro•
has produced virtually no law of significance.•

sui~ide,

!Epmphasis added).

In citing that same provision in the order,

the administrative law judge substituted the word "rule" for the
underlined word "law.•
In other words, Professor Larson does not suggest there
is no rule allowing the defense of intentional self-injury to
apply in cases not involving a suicide.
are very few cases on the subject.
~xplain

Rather, he says there

Professor Larson goes on to

the reason, namely that the compensation levels for
compensation are sufficiently low that most

work~en's

~orkers

Nould not intentionally injure themselves for the purpose of
workers compensation benefits.

r~ce1~ing

T~e

:J~st~~o
~

'' • 'c t

t ;

language of the statute is clear and courts must

languaq~

-e

·,.;3cLn':>n

r 3 t '1 e r

of a
t!1

st3t~to

an : J t ll e

Toll 'ln·lJ•?

1

to make it purposefJl and
nd

;_,·~·)n':;

me 3

n i n -3 1 e 55 •

357 ?.2d 71)

Davis

v •

(\\ash. 1960).

T"le
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qualification to the clear langugage of the statute which would
.ate it futile and . . aningless and certainly destroys the clear
lantuage of the statute.

As was stated in a recent Indiana case,

the . . aning of •intentionally self-inflicted" is plain and
una8biguoua, and •when the evidence suggests, and the Board finds
that an e•ployee intentionally inflicted injury upon himself,
co.penaation •uat be denied.•
Contractors, Inc.

Henry v. Schenk Mechanical

346 N.!.2d 616 (Ind. 1976).

A good case in point is Carland v. Vance, 137 Pa.
Super. 47, 10 A.2d 114 (1939), where the claimant working in a
gasoline station had his trousers saturated with gasoline.

On a

dare, he struck a match and applied it to his trousers which
caught fire, causing him injury.

The court in that case denied

the claim on the basis of both the self-inflicted injury as well
as the tact that there was no accident.

The court held that "the

element of being unforeseen, something that is not expected or
intended, result from an unknown cause, or an unusual effect of a
known cause" was missing. Id. at 115.

The court stated further:

The claimant's own testimony conclusively
shows that the result which followed his
foolish act was expected. The inevitable and
anticipated consequence of applying a match
to material made inflammable by gasoline
occurr'!d.
Id. at 115.

Ther-' ts no questtJn tn this case that

~'le

clai,nant ltl
I'1 t:-ns
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case the court held that the claimant's injuries fro• a coworker's blows were the result of the claimant's willful
intention to injure himself.

The court held that the clai•ant in

anger intended to provoke his co-worker with his remarks.

The

fact that he was injured by his co-worker came because of his own
deliberate action.

There was, said the court, •a reasonable
~at

expectation of bringing about a real injury to hi•self.•
260.

The Industrial Commission has not cited a case nor does
there appear to be a case which holds that the self-injury •ust
~e

suicidal in nature in order for it to be a defense.

The fact

that most self-injury cases which have come before the courts are
suicidal in nature does not change the real intent of the
language nor place any modifications on the same.

The Industrial

Commission was in error in determining that the self-inflicted
injury defense applies only in the cases of suicide or attempted
suicide.

Therefore the decision of the Industrial Commission

should be reversed and defendant Spackman's claim should be
totally denied.
POINT II
--SPACKMAN'S INJURY DID NOT COME
I~

~s

>ls··,
~"t:r~

_' iu

THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT

has been outlined in the Statement of Facts of this

:lC>fe>ndar1t Spack:nan was clearly on his break during the
Pp1sode
t 1>75

nor

1~vol~ed
l·)l

1n this case.

n::j some t'11n9 in some

~e

'-'3'!

was

nei~~er

discharging

connected with or
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door.

See, Sullivan v. Industrial Comm., 79 Utah 317, 10 P.2d

t2C (1932).

Althouqh a temporary work atop will not by itself

bar recovery, the injury has to be one to which the employee is
••posed as an eaployee in his employment.

California

Caayalty lndea. !xch. v. Industrial Ace. Comm., 21 Cal.2d 461,

132 P.2d 815 (19C2).
In this particular case defendant Spackman would not
noraally have been injured by going through the one door he used
in the course of his employment.

He testified, as cited above,

that he did not normally smash both fists against the two doors
at the same time since he knew that the right door was always
locked.

Hence, Spackman was not carrying out his duties as an

eaployee and was engaged in an activity to which he would not
normally be exposed as an employee at the time he injured
himself.

For that reason he should be denied compensation in

this case.
POINT III
THERE WAS NO "ACCIDENT" INVOLVED IN THIS CASE AS
THAT WORD IS DEFINED IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW.

As was decided in a recent case before this Court, and
as has been the rule of law in Utah throughout the life of
workmens' compensation law, an "accident" for purposes of
compensability must tnvolve an unanticipated, unintended
occurrence different from what would normally be
occur in the usual course of events.
of Latter-day
(Utah

1979);

Sat~ts

v.

C:ulina ,.

~xpected

to

The Church of Jesus Chrtdt

I~dustrtal

Commisston,

I~c1ustnal

C)m.':1l.oston, 16

P.2d
·~·.2rl

2G•l,
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3~9

P.2d 202 (1965).

There was nothing unusual or unanticipated

about the injury which occurred to defendant Spackman.

Be

purposely and intentionally hit his hand against a locked .. tal
door.

That he received a broken finger as a result is no .are an

unusual result than in the Carland v. Vance case, supra, wbere
the employee by igniting his pants soaked with gasoline received
a rather bad burn.

In both cases, there was injury but in both

cases it was the very injury which one would anticipate or expect
under the circumstances.

The only surprising fact is that

Spackman's hand was not more severely injured.
POINT IV
IF SPACKMAN IS TO BE AWARDED COMPENSATION, THE PERIOD OF
TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY AND THE AMOUNT OF MEDICAL EXPENSES
TO BE PAID SHOULD BE REDUCED.
As noted in the Statement of the Facts in this case,
within one week after the initial injury, defendant Spackman hit
the ceiling of his room, causing additional injury to his finger.
The act of hitting the ceiling was not secondary to the original
tnjury but was a new intervening action.
r~covery

r~covery,

Therefore the period of

as well as medical expenses connected with the prolonged
including the onset of infection, should not be charged

3gatnst 9laintiff in this case.
It should also be noted that the injury was only of the
:t•tl~
-::·~'.rl

ftnger.

There is no evidence that

n.Jt ..,ork wit'.1

J~~·nJant

t:1~

r~st

~ef~ndant

of his uninjured body.

3packman w1s going to school and had only

"lrt-ttme for platntiEf.

Spackman
11oreover,
~een wor~ing

There is no evi1ence that he could not
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qet soae other part-tiae job.

Hence, except for perhaps a very

short period, plaintiff should not be charged temporary total
disability.

SUMMARY
There is no dispute in this case that the injury to
defendant Spackaan came as a direct result of his expressing
anqer by ••ashinq his fist against a locked metal door.

That

action constitutes an intentional self-inflicted injury clearly
within the meaning of the law.

There was no "accident• involved

since the ensuing result was anticipated.
took place during a lunch break period.
the nature of the activity

Spack~an

Moreover, all of this
Therefore, considering

was involved in and the fact

that he was not performing any service for his employer at the
time of the injury, he was not injured in the course of his
employment.
Totaling everything u9,
to find that defendant

Spack~an

there is more than ample reason

was not entitled to any

compensation for his injury of April 5, 1978.

The Industrial

Commission clearly misapplied the law in this case in so awarding
compensatton.

T~at

award should be reversed by this Court and

defendant Spackman's claim for compensation should be denied.
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